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Wei-Xuan Li a,1, Clara Chia-Sheng Chen a,2, Joseph J. French b,⁎
a School of Business, The Richard Stockton College of New Jersey, 101 Vera King Farris Drive, Galloway, NJ 08205, United States
b Monfort College of Business, University of Northern Colorado, Campus box 128, Greeley, CO 80631, United States
a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t
Article history:
Received 30 September 2011
Received in revised form 19 July 2012
Accepted 26 July 2012
Available online 4 August 2012
This paper examines the hypotheses that liquidity improves corporate
governance, and better governance enhances valuation of Russian
firms. We find a positive causal relationship between measures of
liquidity and corporate governance. Additionally, we document the
strong positive impact of corporate governance on valuation. Our
results are economically significant. For example, we document that a
10% decrease in the proportion of zero return days implies a 0.34%
increase in transparency and disclosure, which in turn leads to a
9.6% increase in firm valuation. Our research findings shed light on
the important role of liquidity in improving corporate governance
and valuation.
© 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
JEL classification:
F39
G39
G15
Keywords:
Corporate governance
Liquidity
Russia
Tobin's Q
1. Introduction
This paper examines the channel relationship between stock market liquidity, corporate governance,
and firm valuation of Russian firms from 2002 to 2009. The impact of liquidity on corporate governance is
still a subject of debate in academic literature. One strand of literature argues that market liquidity has a
negative impact on efficiently governed firms as excess monitoring by small investors can undermine the
control of large active institutional investors.3 On the other hand, Maug (1998) argues that liquid equity
⁎ Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 970 351 1226.
E-mail addresses: [email protected] (W.-X. Li), [email protected] (C.C.-S. Chen), [email protected] (J.J. French).
1 Tel.: +1 609 626 3578.
2 Tel.: +1 609 652 4534.
3 Bhide (1993), Coffee (1991), Kahn and Winton (1998), and Roe (1994) are excellent examples of this research.
1566-0141/$ – see front matter © 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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Wei-Xuan Li a,1, Clara Chia-Sheng Chen a,2, Joseph J. French b,⁎
a School of Business, The Richard Stockton College of New Jersey, 101 Vera King Farris Drive, Galloway, NJ 08205, United States
b Monfort College of Business, University of Northern Colorado, Campus box 128, Greeley, CO 80631, United States
a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t
Article history:
Received 30 September 2011
Received in revised form 19 July 2012
Accepted 26 July 2012
Available online 4 August 2012
This paper examines the hypotheses that liquidity improves corporate
governance, and better governance enhances valuation of Russian
firms. We find a positive causal relationship between measures of
liquidity and corporate governance. Additionally, we document the
strong positive impact of corporate governance on valuation. Our
results are economically significant. For example, we document that a
10% decrease in the proportion of zero return days implies a 0.34%
increase in transparency and disclosure, which in turn leads to a
9.6% increase in firm valuation. Our research findings shed light on
the important role of liquidity in improving corporate governance
and valuation.
© 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
JEL classification:
F39
G39
G15
Keywords:
Corporate governance
Liquidity
Russia
Tobin's Q
1. Introduction
This paper examines the channel relationship between stock market liquidity, corporate governance,
and firm valuation of Russian firms from 2002 to 2009. The impact of liquidity on corporate governance is
still a subject of debate in academic literature. One strand of literature argues that market liquidity has a
negative impact on efficiently governed firms as excess monitoring by small investors can undermine the
control of large active institutional investors.3 On the other hand, Maug (1998) argues that liquid equity
⁎ Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 970 351 1226.
E-mail addresses: [email protected] (W.-X. Li), [email protected] (C.C.-S. Chen), [email protected] (J.J. French).
1 Tel.: +1 609 626 3578.
2 Tel.: +1 609 652 4534.
3 Bhide (1993), Coffee (1991), Kahn and Winton (1998), and Roe (1994) are excellent examples of this research.
1566-0141/$ – see front matter © 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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