allcrazygroup_94
New Member
Download Tiểu luận Sự can thiệp của FED thông qua các công cụ chính sách tiền tệ trong giai đoạn khủng hoảng 2007 - 2008
SỰ CAN THIỆP CỦA FED THÔNG QUA CÁC CÔNG CỤ CSTT GIAI ĐOẠN KHỦNG HOẢNG 2007 - 2008 TCNH K10 - NHÓM 09 NHÓM HỌC VIÊN: Hồ Minh Trí Trần Thị Hương Trang Lâm Ngọc Như Uyên Phạm Thị Thanh Vân Lê Nguyễn Thụy Vi NỘI DUNG TRÌNH BÀY PHÂN TÍCH DIỄN BIẾN KHỦNG HOẢNG TÀI CHÍNH MỸ 2 HỆ QUẢ TỪ KHỦNG HOẢNG & TRIỂN VỌNG KINH TẾ THẾ GIỚI 4 CÁC CHƯƠNG TRÌNH GIẢI CỨU CỦA FED 3 TỔNG QUAN VỀ NGUYÊN NHÂN KHỦNG HOẢNG Ở MỸ (2007 - 2008) 1 TỔNG QUAN VỀ NGUYÊN NHÂN KHỦNG HOẢNG Ở MỸ (2007 - 2008) 2007: Subprime mortgage crisis (ban đầu chỉ ~ 70 tỷ USD). 6/8/2007: American Home Mortgage nộp đơn xin bảo hộ phá sản sau khi đã sa thải phần lớn nhân viên của mình. FED, ECB, BOJ, BOE, BOC, .v.v. bơm hàng trăm tỷ USD để cấp thanh khoản cho thị trường, hạ lãi suất, .v.v. 12/12/2007: Term Auction Facility –TAF. 11/03: Term Securities Lending Facility – TSLF. 14/03: JP Morgan mua lại Bear Stearns với sự “bảo trợ” của Fed. 16/03: Primary Dealer Credit Facility- PDCF. 18/03 Tiếp tục cắt giảm lãi suất. Giá dầu leo lên mức kỷ lục mọi thời đại $147/thùng. Sau khi Indy Mac phá sản (11/7) Paulson buộc phải tìm giải pháp bailout cho hai tồ chức này. TỔNG QUAN VỀ NGUYÊN NHÂN KHỦNG HOẢNG Ở MỸ (2007 - 2008) Quốc hữu hóa Fannie Mac & Freddie Mac. 14/09, Fred buông Lehman & Merrill Lynch bị Bank of America thâu tóm. 16/09, NHTW các nước đã đổ hàng tỷ USD vào thị trường tiền tệ nhằm ngăn chặn sự đóng băng của hệ thống tài chính toàn cầu; 19/09: Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility –AMLF; 20-21/09: FED công bố bảng chi tiết kế hoạch giải cứu 700 tỷ USD. Goldman Sachs & Morgan Stanley được chuyển đổi thành tập đoàn ngân hàng đa năng; AIG (09/2008) & Citigroup (12/2008) được giải cứu. NỔ BONG BÓNG THỊ TRƯỜNG BẤT ĐỘNG SẢN To recap, by the beginning of 2007: Home prices were at unprecedented levels. Home owners had more leverage than ever before. Mortgage quality had declined substantially. Asset-backed securitizations had spread well beyond the GSEs. Equivalent to a price-earnings ratio for equity, data beginning in 1955 make clear how extraordinary the first five years of the 21st century were. Normally, home prices are between 9 and 11 times the annual level of rent paid. That makes sense, as it implies an average user cost of housing of around 10 percent. But since 2000, prices have skyrocketed, leaving rents in the dust. The price-to-rent ratio peaked at the end of 2006, reaching the rather extraordinary level of 14.5, clearly suggesting the existence of a “bubble” in residential housing. Home prices were at levels far higher than justified by fundamental values. The preliminary conclusion from information like that in Figure 1 is that either the price of home price would have to fall, rents would have to rise, or some combination of the two. And the size of the adjustment needed to be large – at least 20 percent. Figure 2 separates the value of residential housing into owners’ equity and borrowing (combining mortgages and home equity loans). What we see is that as the value of residential real estate rose, mortgage borrowing increased even faster. Since 1995 home equity has fallen from 58, already far below the 69 percent level a decade earlier, to 52 percent of home value. Securitization facilitated this increase in household verage. Briefly, here’s how the process works. Instead of a lending to a home buyer and holding the mortgage on its own balance sheet, the lender makes the initial loan and puts it into a “pool” containing a large number of other similar mortgages. This pool then serves as collateral for what are called mortgage-backed securities (MBS). The owners of these mortgage-backed securities (known also as “pass-through” securities) received the payments from the borrowers whose mortgages are in the pool. Figure 3 shows the fraction of newly issued mortgages that went into mortgage pools. The mortgage-backed data are separated into two categories. The first are Government-Sponsored Enterprises, or GSEs, primarily the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal National Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac). The mortgage pools sponsored by the GSEs include loans with a maximum value, increased form $417,000 to $727,750 in March 2008, and a variety of requirements for borrowers. Importantly, the GSEs’ basic business is to insure mortgages, so buyers of the securities issued by GSEs can do so without fear of default on the underlying mortgages. Mortgage-backed securities issued by other financial intermediaries, the ones labeled simply “ABS issuers” in the figure, do not have this same insurance. And by 2005 the financial system had created amyriad of products that facilitated the origination of these alternative mortgages. Greenlaw, Hatzius, Kashyap, and Shin (2008) report that from 2001 to 2006 the percent of mortgage originations (measured by value) in the first group, so-called “jumbo” mortgages, actually fell slightly, while the fraction in the second exploded. Over this six year period, mortgages in this low quality group rose from 9.7% to 33.5% of mortgages issued. NGUYÊN NHÂN KHỦNG HOẢNG Ở MỸ (2007-2008) 10 năm 3 tháng Đắt Rẻ FED duy trì FFR Thấp In May 2007 Federal Reserve Board Chairman Ben S. Bernanke (2007) noted that in the case of the sub-prime mortgage market it has created what is known as a “principal-agent” problem. Sub-prime mortgage originators act as the agents for the investors, who are the principals. And the principals failed to impose sufficient discipline on their agents. The result has been a myriad of increasingly complex and insufficiently transparent securities that virtually no one understands how to value. Unsophisticated investors purchased these assets without even realizing what questions they should be asking of the sellers. The result of this lack of discipline and transparency is that the securities were overpriced. These products come under the general classification of “collateralized debt obligations” or CDOs. CDOs are commonly constructed from not only home mortgages, but also things like credit card debt and student loans. They are then cut up into tranches with different credit ratings – the AAA-rated, or senior, tranches are paid first; then there might be a BBB-rated tranche paid, and eventually what is called the “equity” tranche that is paid last (and suffers the first default). The creation of structured financial products relies on the ratings agencies – Moody’s, Standard and Poors, and Fitch – to give their blessing to what is being sold. Without a AAA rating, the senior tranches of CDOs would command lower prices and might not be worth selling. DIỄN BIẾN THAY ĐỔI LÃI SUẤT CHÍNH SÁCH Ở MỸ Once the FOMC sets the target, the Open Market Operations Desk at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York engages in daily operations, adjusting the supply of reserves in an effort to keep the market rate close to the target using the methods described earlier Finally, soon after the crisis started, it became clear that everyone, banks included, were having trouble valuing a broad range of assets. This is exactly what one expects to see in a crisis, andit has important consequences. Not knowing the value of what was on their own balance sheets, bankers were unsure of their own lending capacity. Adding to the problem is that increased volatility in markets drove up conventional measures of risk, forcing banks to reduce the overall size of their balance sheets, all else equal. Together, these led to a vastly reduced level of term lending. Looking at all of this, a picture of the crisis emerges in which opaque, difficult to value assets cannot be used as collateral to back either commercial paper issuance or lending. As a result, it became impossible for some financial intermediaries to finance themselves through what had been accepted channels. Those that had issued commercial paper into financial markets could not; and those that had borrowed from their fellow financial intermediaries, could not either. No one knew what securities were worth, so there was no way to establish the value of collateral or the creditworthiness of borrower. Add to that the fact that banks did not want to lend because of the risk of hitting the constraint imposed by the regulatory capital requirement, and we have a severe financial crisis. Background for New Balance Sheet Initiatives c Asset price shock write – down, sales additional price declines. Dele...
Do Drive thay đổi chính sách, nên một số link cũ yêu cầu duyệt download. các bạn chỉ cần làm theo hướng dẫn.
Password giải nén nếu cần: ket-noi.com | Bấm trực tiếp vào Link để tải:
SỰ CAN THIỆP CỦA FED THÔNG QUA CÁC CÔNG CỤ CSTT GIAI ĐOẠN KHỦNG HOẢNG 2007 - 2008 TCNH K10 - NHÓM 09 NHÓM HỌC VIÊN: Hồ Minh Trí Trần Thị Hương Trang Lâm Ngọc Như Uyên Phạm Thị Thanh Vân Lê Nguyễn Thụy Vi NỘI DUNG TRÌNH BÀY PHÂN TÍCH DIỄN BIẾN KHỦNG HOẢNG TÀI CHÍNH MỸ 2 HỆ QUẢ TỪ KHỦNG HOẢNG & TRIỂN VỌNG KINH TẾ THẾ GIỚI 4 CÁC CHƯƠNG TRÌNH GIẢI CỨU CỦA FED 3 TỔNG QUAN VỀ NGUYÊN NHÂN KHỦNG HOẢNG Ở MỸ (2007 - 2008) 1 TỔNG QUAN VỀ NGUYÊN NHÂN KHỦNG HOẢNG Ở MỸ (2007 - 2008) 2007: Subprime mortgage crisis (ban đầu chỉ ~ 70 tỷ USD). 6/8/2007: American Home Mortgage nộp đơn xin bảo hộ phá sản sau khi đã sa thải phần lớn nhân viên của mình. FED, ECB, BOJ, BOE, BOC, .v.v. bơm hàng trăm tỷ USD để cấp thanh khoản cho thị trường, hạ lãi suất, .v.v. 12/12/2007: Term Auction Facility –TAF. 11/03: Term Securities Lending Facility – TSLF. 14/03: JP Morgan mua lại Bear Stearns với sự “bảo trợ” của Fed. 16/03: Primary Dealer Credit Facility- PDCF. 18/03 Tiếp tục cắt giảm lãi suất. Giá dầu leo lên mức kỷ lục mọi thời đại $147/thùng. Sau khi Indy Mac phá sản (11/7) Paulson buộc phải tìm giải pháp bailout cho hai tồ chức này. TỔNG QUAN VỀ NGUYÊN NHÂN KHỦNG HOẢNG Ở MỸ (2007 - 2008) Quốc hữu hóa Fannie Mac & Freddie Mac. 14/09, Fred buông Lehman & Merrill Lynch bị Bank of America thâu tóm. 16/09, NHTW các nước đã đổ hàng tỷ USD vào thị trường tiền tệ nhằm ngăn chặn sự đóng băng của hệ thống tài chính toàn cầu; 19/09: Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility –AMLF; 20-21/09: FED công bố bảng chi tiết kế hoạch giải cứu 700 tỷ USD. Goldman Sachs & Morgan Stanley được chuyển đổi thành tập đoàn ngân hàng đa năng; AIG (09/2008) & Citigroup (12/2008) được giải cứu. NỔ BONG BÓNG THỊ TRƯỜNG BẤT ĐỘNG SẢN To recap, by the beginning of 2007: Home prices were at unprecedented levels. Home owners had more leverage than ever before. Mortgage quality had declined substantially. Asset-backed securitizations had spread well beyond the GSEs. Equivalent to a price-earnings ratio for equity, data beginning in 1955 make clear how extraordinary the first five years of the 21st century were. Normally, home prices are between 9 and 11 times the annual level of rent paid. That makes sense, as it implies an average user cost of housing of around 10 percent. But since 2000, prices have skyrocketed, leaving rents in the dust. The price-to-rent ratio peaked at the end of 2006, reaching the rather extraordinary level of 14.5, clearly suggesting the existence of a “bubble” in residential housing. Home prices were at levels far higher than justified by fundamental values. The preliminary conclusion from information like that in Figure 1 is that either the price of home price would have to fall, rents would have to rise, or some combination of the two. And the size of the adjustment needed to be large – at least 20 percent. Figure 2 separates the value of residential housing into owners’ equity and borrowing (combining mortgages and home equity loans). What we see is that as the value of residential real estate rose, mortgage borrowing increased even faster. Since 1995 home equity has fallen from 58, already far below the 69 percent level a decade earlier, to 52 percent of home value. Securitization facilitated this increase in household verage. Briefly, here’s how the process works. Instead of a lending to a home buyer and holding the mortgage on its own balance sheet, the lender makes the initial loan and puts it into a “pool” containing a large number of other similar mortgages. This pool then serves as collateral for what are called mortgage-backed securities (MBS). The owners of these mortgage-backed securities (known also as “pass-through” securities) received the payments from the borrowers whose mortgages are in the pool. Figure 3 shows the fraction of newly issued mortgages that went into mortgage pools. The mortgage-backed data are separated into two categories. The first are Government-Sponsored Enterprises, or GSEs, primarily the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal National Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac). The mortgage pools sponsored by the GSEs include loans with a maximum value, increased form $417,000 to $727,750 in March 2008, and a variety of requirements for borrowers. Importantly, the GSEs’ basic business is to insure mortgages, so buyers of the securities issued by GSEs can do so without fear of default on the underlying mortgages. Mortgage-backed securities issued by other financial intermediaries, the ones labeled simply “ABS issuers” in the figure, do not have this same insurance. And by 2005 the financial system had created amyriad of products that facilitated the origination of these alternative mortgages. Greenlaw, Hatzius, Kashyap, and Shin (2008) report that from 2001 to 2006 the percent of mortgage originations (measured by value) in the first group, so-called “jumbo” mortgages, actually fell slightly, while the fraction in the second exploded. Over this six year period, mortgages in this low quality group rose from 9.7% to 33.5% of mortgages issued. NGUYÊN NHÂN KHỦNG HOẢNG Ở MỸ (2007-2008) 10 năm 3 tháng Đắt Rẻ FED duy trì FFR Thấp In May 2007 Federal Reserve Board Chairman Ben S. Bernanke (2007) noted that in the case of the sub-prime mortgage market it has created what is known as a “principal-agent” problem. Sub-prime mortgage originators act as the agents for the investors, who are the principals. And the principals failed to impose sufficient discipline on their agents. The result has been a myriad of increasingly complex and insufficiently transparent securities that virtually no one understands how to value. Unsophisticated investors purchased these assets without even realizing what questions they should be asking of the sellers. The result of this lack of discipline and transparency is that the securities were overpriced. These products come under the general classification of “collateralized debt obligations” or CDOs. CDOs are commonly constructed from not only home mortgages, but also things like credit card debt and student loans. They are then cut up into tranches with different credit ratings – the AAA-rated, or senior, tranches are paid first; then there might be a BBB-rated tranche paid, and eventually what is called the “equity” tranche that is paid last (and suffers the first default). The creation of structured financial products relies on the ratings agencies – Moody’s, Standard and Poors, and Fitch – to give their blessing to what is being sold. Without a AAA rating, the senior tranches of CDOs would command lower prices and might not be worth selling. DIỄN BIẾN THAY ĐỔI LÃI SUẤT CHÍNH SÁCH Ở MỸ Once the FOMC sets the target, the Open Market Operations Desk at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York engages in daily operations, adjusting the supply of reserves in an effort to keep the market rate close to the target using the methods described earlier Finally, soon after the crisis started, it became clear that everyone, banks included, were having trouble valuing a broad range of assets. This is exactly what one expects to see in a crisis, andit has important consequences. Not knowing the value of what was on their own balance sheets, bankers were unsure of their own lending capacity. Adding to the problem is that increased volatility in markets drove up conventional measures of risk, forcing banks to reduce the overall size of their balance sheets, all else equal. Together, these led to a vastly reduced level of term lending. Looking at all of this, a picture of the crisis emerges in which opaque, difficult to value assets cannot be used as collateral to back either commercial paper issuance or lending. As a result, it became impossible for some financial intermediaries to finance themselves through what had been accepted channels. Those that had issued commercial paper into financial markets could not; and those that had borrowed from their fellow financial intermediaries, could not either. No one knew what securities were worth, so there was no way to establish the value of collateral or the creditworthiness of borrower. Add to that the fact that banks did not want to lend because of the risk of hitting the constraint imposed by the regulatory capital requirement, and we have a severe financial crisis. Background for New Balance Sheet Initiatives c Asset price shock write – down, sales additional price declines. Dele...
Do Drive thay đổi chính sách, nên một số link cũ yêu cầu duyệt download. các bạn chỉ cần làm theo hướng dẫn.
Password giải nén nếu cần: ket-noi.com | Bấm trực tiếp vào Link để tải:
You must be registered for see links
Last edited by a moderator: