Link tải miễn phí Luận văn: Chính sách đối ngoại Mỹ trong thời kỳ cầm quyền của Harry Truman (1945 - 1952) : Luận văn ThS. Lịch sử: 5.08.01
Nhà xuất bản: Đại học Quốc gia Hà Nội
Ngày: 2006
Chủ đề: Chính sách đối ngoại
Harry Truman
Lịch sử Mỹ
Miêu tả: 153 tr. + Tóm tắt+CD-ROM
Cơ sở hoạch định chính sách đối ngoại của Mỹ sau Chiến tranh thế giới thứ hai. Chính sách đối ngoại của chính quyền Truman những năm 1945 - 1949: sự khởi đầu của chiến tranh lạnh. Chính sách đối ngoại Mỹ giai đoạn này tập trung chủ yếu vào châu Âu - chủ yếu là Liên Xô và Tây Âu, tại châu Á với Nhật Bản và Trung Quốc. Trình bày chính sách đối ngoại Mỹ thực thi trong thời gian từ cuối năm 1949 tới hết nhiệm kỳ của Truman (1952) - giai đoạn này được đánh dấu bằng việc đẩy mạnh quân sự hóa và can thiệp vũ trang vào thế giới thứ ba nhằm mở rộng ảnh hưởng của Mỹ ra toàn thế giới
Ldi md ddu 1
Chufong 1: Co so hoach dinh chinh sach ddi ngoai cua My 9
sau Chien tranh the gidi thur hai
LI. Bdi canh qudc te' 9
1.1.1. Su hinh thanh Trat tu the gidi hai cue 9
1.1.2. Chu nghia xa hdi trd thanh mot he thong nhieu nude 16
1.1.3. Su phat trien ciia phong trao giai phdng dan tdc va dan chu 20
hda tren pham vi toan the gidi
1.2. Cac nhan to trong nude 23
1.2.1. Tiem luc cua My sau Chie'n tranh the gidi thu: hai 23
1.2.2. Ke' hoach ba quyen cua My 26
1.2.3. Vai trd canhan 31
Chirong 2. Chinh sach ddi ngoai cua chinh quyen Truman 34
nhCrng nam 2945-1949: Su* khdi dau cua chien tranh lanh
2.1. Chinh sach cua My d chau Au 34
2.1.1. Chinh sach cua My ddi vdi Lien Xd: Sir bat dau cua 34
Chien tranh lanh
2T. 1.1. Su cang thang gia tang trong quan he My - Xd 35
2.1.1.2. Ngoai giao nguyen tir 40
2.LL3. Chinh sach ngan chan 46
2.1.2. Chinh sach cua My d Tay Au: Ba khiic dao dau ciia 49
Chien tranh lanh
2.1.2.1. Hgc thuye't Truman 49
2.1.2.2. Ke hoach Marshall 53
2.1.2.3. Su hinh thanh NATO va Lien minh Dai Tay Duong 58
2.1.2.4. Chia cat nude Due 6
LC)I M 6 DAU
1. Muc dich va y nghia ciia de tai
The' ky XX da khep lai, nhung nhiing bie'n dgng to Idn trong the ky nay
vSn ghi dam dau an khi nhan loai budc vao the ky XXI. Trong 100 nam ciia
the' ky XX, loai ngudi da phai chiing kien hai cudc chien tranh the gidi tan
khdc nh^'t trong lich sir va mot cudc chien tranh lanh keo dai hon 40 nam giua
hai sieu cudng cua the' gidi, ciing vd so nhiing cudc xung dot ndng d khu vuc
ngoai vi ma it nhieu deu chiu anh hudng cua chie'n tranh lanh. Trong the ky
nay, cudc Cach mang thang Mudi Nga vi dai da md ra mot trang mdi trong
lich sir nhan loai, dong thdi phong trao giai phdng dan toe dang cao da ghi ten
hang loat qudc gia doe laptop mdi len ban do the' gidi. The ky XX ciing da chiing
kien su trdi day manh me ciia nude My - mot qudc gia chi cd lich sir hon 200
nam - trd thanh qudc gia diing dau he thd'ng tU ban chu nghia the' gidi, thanh
mot cue trong trat tu hai cue chi phdi quan he qudc te' sudt hon 40 nam va la
sieu cudrig duy nha't tren the' gidi sau khi Lien bang Cong hda xa hdi chu
nghia Xdviet tan ra vao dSu thap nien 1990. Dugc menh danh la "ngudi khong
16" ve kinh te' va quan su, tieng ndi cua My cd trgng lugng trong hau het cac
van de qudc te'. Budc sang the ky XXI, cue dien the gidi mdi dang tirng budc
hinh thanh, song My vSn la cudng qudc hang dau, la nhan to quan trgng phai
tinh de'n trong qua trinh hoach dinh chinh sach ddi ngoai ciia mdi qudc gia.
' ' Thuc hien dudng ldi ddi ngoai ddc lap, tu chii, rdng md, da phuong hda,
da dang hda cac quan he qudc te, vdi tinh than Viet Nam san sang la ban, la ddi
tac tin cay cua cac nude trong cong dong qudc te', phan dau vi hda hinh, ddc lap
va phat trien, chiing ta da phat trien quan he vdi cac nude, cac trung tam chinh
tri - kinh'te' tren the gidi, trong dd cd My. Vdi siic manh to Idn ve mgi mat, dac
biet vdi nen kinh te khong 16 ciia minh. My cQng ngay cang cd anh hudng quan
trgng ddi vdi cdng cudc phat trien kinh te' ciia Viet Nam. Chinh vi vay, viec
nghien cuti va tim hieu mgi mat ddi song xa hdi My, dac biet la chinh sach ddi
ngoai ciia My, la thuc su can thie't ddi vdi chiing ta bdi nhieu ly do:
there is some reason why the experiences of the war brought basic political changes to
every one of the great governments of the west. Surely the causes of that phenomenon are
basic enough to be present somewhere in the obscurity of Soviet pohtical life, as well. And
yet no recognition has been given to these causes in Russia.
It must be surmised from this that even within so highly disciplined an organization
as the Communist Party there must be a growing divergence in age, outlook and interest
between the great mass of Party members, only so recently recruited into the movement,
and the little self-perpetuating chque of men at the top, whom most of these Party members
have never met, with whom they have never conversed, and with whom they can have no
political intimacy.
Who can say whether, in these circumstances, the eventual rejuvenation of the higher
spheres of authority (which can only be a matter of time) can take place smoothly and
peacefully, or whether rivals in the quest for higher power will not eventually reach down
into these politically immature and inexperienced masses in order to find support for their
respective claims? If this were ever to happen, strange consequences could flow for the
Communist Party: for the membership at large has been exercised only in the practices of
iron discipline and obedience and not in the arts of compromise and accommodation. And
if disunity were ever to seize and paralyze the Party, the chaos and weakness of Russian
society would be revealed in forms beyond description. For we have seen that Soviet
power is only concealing an amorphous mass of human beings among whom no
independent organizational structure is tolerated. In Russia there is not even such a thing as
local government. The present generation of Russians have never known spontaneity of
collective action. If, consequently, anything were ever to occur to disrupt the unity and
efficacy of the Party as a pohtical instrument, Soviet Russia might be changed overnight
from one of the strongest to one of the weakest and most pitiable of national societies.
Thus the futtore of Soviet power may not be by any means as secure as Russian
capacity for self delusion would make it appear to the men of the Kremlin. That they can
quietly and easily turn it over to others remains to be proved. Meanwhile, the hardships of
thefr nile and the vicissitudes of international life have taken a heavy toll of the strength
and hopes of the great people on whom their power rests. It is curious to note that the
ideological power of Soviet authority is sttongest today in areas beyond the frontiers of
Russia, beyond the reach of its police power. This phenomenon bnngs to mind a
comparison used by Thomas Mann in his great novel Buddenbrooks. Observing that
hmnan institutions often show the greatest outward brilhance at a moment when imier
decay is in reality farthest advanced, he compared one of those stars whose light shines
most brightly on this worid when in reality it has long since ceased to exist. And who can
say with assurance that the strong light still cast by the Kremlin on the dissatisfied peoples
of the western world is not the powerfiil afterglow of a constellation which is in actua ity
on the wane? This camiot be proved. And it camiot be disproved. But the possibi ty
remains (and in the opinion of this writer it is a strong one) that Soviet power, like the
Do Drive thay đổi chính sách, nên một số link cũ yêu cầu duyệt download. các bạn chỉ cần làm theo hướng dẫn.
Password giải nén nếu cần: ket-noi.com | Bấm trực tiếp vào Link để tải:
Nhà xuất bản: Đại học Quốc gia Hà Nội
Ngày: 2006
Chủ đề: Chính sách đối ngoại
Harry Truman
Lịch sử Mỹ
Miêu tả: 153 tr. + Tóm tắt+CD-ROM
Cơ sở hoạch định chính sách đối ngoại của Mỹ sau Chiến tranh thế giới thứ hai. Chính sách đối ngoại của chính quyền Truman những năm 1945 - 1949: sự khởi đầu của chiến tranh lạnh. Chính sách đối ngoại Mỹ giai đoạn này tập trung chủ yếu vào châu Âu - chủ yếu là Liên Xô và Tây Âu, tại châu Á với Nhật Bản và Trung Quốc. Trình bày chính sách đối ngoại Mỹ thực thi trong thời gian từ cuối năm 1949 tới hết nhiệm kỳ của Truman (1952) - giai đoạn này được đánh dấu bằng việc đẩy mạnh quân sự hóa và can thiệp vũ trang vào thế giới thứ ba nhằm mở rộng ảnh hưởng của Mỹ ra toàn thế giới
Ldi md ddu 1
Chufong 1: Co so hoach dinh chinh sach ddi ngoai cua My 9
sau Chien tranh the gidi thur hai
LI. Bdi canh qudc te' 9
1.1.1. Su hinh thanh Trat tu the gidi hai cue 9
1.1.2. Chu nghia xa hdi trd thanh mot he thong nhieu nude 16
1.1.3. Su phat trien ciia phong trao giai phdng dan tdc va dan chu 20
hda tren pham vi toan the gidi
1.2. Cac nhan to trong nude 23
1.2.1. Tiem luc cua My sau Chie'n tranh the gidi thu: hai 23
1.2.2. Ke' hoach ba quyen cua My 26
1.2.3. Vai trd canhan 31
Chirong 2. Chinh sach ddi ngoai cua chinh quyen Truman 34
nhCrng nam 2945-1949: Su* khdi dau cua chien tranh lanh
2.1. Chinh sach cua My d chau Au 34
2.1.1. Chinh sach cua My ddi vdi Lien Xd: Sir bat dau cua 34
Chien tranh lanh
2T. 1.1. Su cang thang gia tang trong quan he My - Xd 35
2.1.1.2. Ngoai giao nguyen tir 40
2.LL3. Chinh sach ngan chan 46
2.1.2. Chinh sach cua My d Tay Au: Ba khiic dao dau ciia 49
Chien tranh lanh
2.1.2.1. Hgc thuye't Truman 49
2.1.2.2. Ke hoach Marshall 53
2.1.2.3. Su hinh thanh NATO va Lien minh Dai Tay Duong 58
2.1.2.4. Chia cat nude Due 6
LC)I M 6 DAU
1. Muc dich va y nghia ciia de tai
The' ky XX da khep lai, nhung nhiing bie'n dgng to Idn trong the ky nay
vSn ghi dam dau an khi nhan loai budc vao the ky XXI. Trong 100 nam ciia
the' ky XX, loai ngudi da phai chiing kien hai cudc chien tranh the gidi tan
khdc nh^'t trong lich sir va mot cudc chien tranh lanh keo dai hon 40 nam giua
hai sieu cudng cua the' gidi, ciing vd so nhiing cudc xung dot ndng d khu vuc
ngoai vi ma it nhieu deu chiu anh hudng cua chie'n tranh lanh. Trong the ky
nay, cudc Cach mang thang Mudi Nga vi dai da md ra mot trang mdi trong
lich sir nhan loai, dong thdi phong trao giai phdng dan toe dang cao da ghi ten
hang loat qudc gia doe laptop mdi len ban do the' gidi. The ky XX ciing da chiing
kien su trdi day manh me ciia nude My - mot qudc gia chi cd lich sir hon 200
nam - trd thanh qudc gia diing dau he thd'ng tU ban chu nghia the' gidi, thanh
mot cue trong trat tu hai cue chi phdi quan he qudc te' sudt hon 40 nam va la
sieu cudrig duy nha't tren the' gidi sau khi Lien bang Cong hda xa hdi chu
nghia Xdviet tan ra vao dSu thap nien 1990. Dugc menh danh la "ngudi khong
16" ve kinh te' va quan su, tieng ndi cua My cd trgng lugng trong hau het cac
van de qudc te'. Budc sang the ky XXI, cue dien the gidi mdi dang tirng budc
hinh thanh, song My vSn la cudng qudc hang dau, la nhan to quan trgng phai
tinh de'n trong qua trinh hoach dinh chinh sach ddi ngoai ciia mdi qudc gia.
' ' Thuc hien dudng ldi ddi ngoai ddc lap, tu chii, rdng md, da phuong hda,
da dang hda cac quan he qudc te, vdi tinh than Viet Nam san sang la ban, la ddi
tac tin cay cua cac nude trong cong dong qudc te', phan dau vi hda hinh, ddc lap
va phat trien, chiing ta da phat trien quan he vdi cac nude, cac trung tam chinh
tri - kinh'te' tren the gidi, trong dd cd My. Vdi siic manh to Idn ve mgi mat, dac
biet vdi nen kinh te khong 16 ciia minh. My cQng ngay cang cd anh hudng quan
trgng ddi vdi cdng cudc phat trien kinh te' ciia Viet Nam. Chinh vi vay, viec
nghien cuti va tim hieu mgi mat ddi song xa hdi My, dac biet la chinh sach ddi
ngoai ciia My, la thuc su can thie't ddi vdi chiing ta bdi nhieu ly do:
there is some reason why the experiences of the war brought basic political changes to
every one of the great governments of the west. Surely the causes of that phenomenon are
basic enough to be present somewhere in the obscurity of Soviet pohtical life, as well. And
yet no recognition has been given to these causes in Russia.
It must be surmised from this that even within so highly disciplined an organization
as the Communist Party there must be a growing divergence in age, outlook and interest
between the great mass of Party members, only so recently recruited into the movement,
and the little self-perpetuating chque of men at the top, whom most of these Party members
have never met, with whom they have never conversed, and with whom they can have no
political intimacy.
Who can say whether, in these circumstances, the eventual rejuvenation of the higher
spheres of authority (which can only be a matter of time) can take place smoothly and
peacefully, or whether rivals in the quest for higher power will not eventually reach down
into these politically immature and inexperienced masses in order to find support for their
respective claims? If this were ever to happen, strange consequences could flow for the
Communist Party: for the membership at large has been exercised only in the practices of
iron discipline and obedience and not in the arts of compromise and accommodation. And
if disunity were ever to seize and paralyze the Party, the chaos and weakness of Russian
society would be revealed in forms beyond description. For we have seen that Soviet
power is only concealing an amorphous mass of human beings among whom no
independent organizational structure is tolerated. In Russia there is not even such a thing as
local government. The present generation of Russians have never known spontaneity of
collective action. If, consequently, anything were ever to occur to disrupt the unity and
efficacy of the Party as a pohtical instrument, Soviet Russia might be changed overnight
from one of the strongest to one of the weakest and most pitiable of national societies.
Thus the futtore of Soviet power may not be by any means as secure as Russian
capacity for self delusion would make it appear to the men of the Kremlin. That they can
quietly and easily turn it over to others remains to be proved. Meanwhile, the hardships of
thefr nile and the vicissitudes of international life have taken a heavy toll of the strength
and hopes of the great people on whom their power rests. It is curious to note that the
ideological power of Soviet authority is sttongest today in areas beyond the frontiers of
Russia, beyond the reach of its police power. This phenomenon bnngs to mind a
comparison used by Thomas Mann in his great novel Buddenbrooks. Observing that
hmnan institutions often show the greatest outward brilhance at a moment when imier
decay is in reality farthest advanced, he compared one of those stars whose light shines
most brightly on this worid when in reality it has long since ceased to exist. And who can
say with assurance that the strong light still cast by the Kremlin on the dissatisfied peoples
of the western world is not the powerfiil afterglow of a constellation which is in actua ity
on the wane? This camiot be proved. And it camiot be disproved. But the possibi ty
remains (and in the opinion of this writer it is a strong one) that Soviet power, like the
Do Drive thay đổi chính sách, nên một số link cũ yêu cầu duyệt download. các bạn chỉ cần làm theo hướng dẫn.
Password giải nén nếu cần: ket-noi.com | Bấm trực tiếp vào Link để tải:
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